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Rejoinder to Ganssle' s 
"Real Problems with Irrealism" 
MARK McLEoD-HARRISON 
Religious Studies Department 
George Fox University 
Newburg, Oregon 
I want to thank Gregory Ganssle for his helpful response to my papers 
on theistic irrealism. 1 There are several rejoinders, so I will be very brief. 
First, Ganssle suggests that I overlook the distinction between the content of 
a position and what it takes to defend a position. In fact, I do not. Perhaps 
the term "epistemizing," since it is a verb, is the culprit creating confusion 
here. But as I note, epistemizing is not the only kind of cognizing. 
Conceptualizing does not involve showing anything (and hence Ganssle's 
distinction does not apply). My position stands: To state the realist position 
conceptualizes (a state not an action) the world as real and hence is an ine-
alist position itself. 
Second, I agree when Ganssle says that my formulation of the argument 
draws existential claims from prepositionally structured premises. Yet I 
believe the spirit of my argument is correct. Ganssle's reply is helpful in 
showing why. He gives two valid versions of the argument. The first version 
of the argument (numbered (1)- (5*)) he thinks I will reject because it shows 
too much, namely, that anything goes and thus that the irrealist ends up in 
radical relativism. I think Ganssle is correct about this. This version, Ganssle 
goes on to claim, does not involve a realist interpretation of noncontradic-
tion. I think it does. Here our intuitions are different, but what is important 
is the reasons they differ. The notion of a purely formal argument (one 
stripped of all interpretation) seems part and parcel with realism. The argu-
ment is assumed to be formal (without interpretation) because it is "just the 
(realist) facts." But the inealist wants to know what "stripped of all interpre-
tation" means. An argument stripped of all interpretation (conceptualizing, 
epistemizing, and so on) is merely ink marks on the page. So although 
Ganssle may be right that his first version of the argument for irrealism 
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shows too much, he seems on shakier ground when he claims his argument 
lacks any realist interpretation. 
The second version of the irrealist argument is numbered (6)-(13*)J 
Ganssle thinks it valid but rejects it because of a version of the consistency 
objection to pluralism. The initial problem for the pluralist is that p and -p 
are inconsistent with one another. The pluralist solves the problem by rela", 
tivizing the two claims to different conceptual schemes or worlds. But then 
the problem is not inconsistency but consistency. Ganssle points out: "If twO' 
propositions have different entailments, they cannot be the same proposi, 
tions."2 Thus, p and -p tum out to be consistent with one another. Since the 
two propositions in question tum out to be consistent, the nonpluralist can 
simply say that there is no real contradiction and therefore no need for a phi+ 
ralist ontology. Absolutism wins. The challenge for the pluralist is to show 
the two claims really are inconsistent across worlds or schemes. The 
response to this issue is fairly straightforward and, in fact, Ganssle hints at 
the solution in his own criticism, namely, "We might be able to say that if the 
propositions p and -p were about or within the same world, then they would 
be contradictory and they could not both be true."3 Unfortunately, Ganssle 
never returns to this possibility. Michael Lynch, however, develops this 
response in his work and it can be summarized thusly: The absolutist claims 
that insofar as two propositions are relative to more than one scheme, that 
there must be some absolute framework within which they can both be con-
sidered. If they are not relative to more than one scheme but only to their par• 
ticular schemes, then they "talk past each other" and are not really inconsis-
tent. But the propositions involved are not absolute propositions. The truth of 
the propositions being relative to more than one scheme does not entail that 
they are independent of all schemes. It turns out to be a necessary truth that 
in every possible world where these propositions (in this case, p and -p) are 
relative to the same scheme, only one is true. So it is a necessary truth that if 
p and -p were claimed in the same possible world, they would be contradic-
tory. But of course, in the irreal worlds of the pluralist, the two are not both 
claimed as true in the same world. That they are kept sealed off from each 
other in two different worlds does not show that p (or -p) relativized to two 
different worlds have different entailments. They would have the same 
entailments, if claimed in a singular world. But Ganssle overlooks this pos-
sibility and continues to assume a realist, absolutist account: There must be 
some singular world in which either p and -p are contradictory or in which 
they are compatible. If contradictory, then only one can be true. If compati-
ble, then we are talking about two different propositions. This is exactly what 
the irrealist rejects. 
2. Ibid., 454. 
3. Ibid. 
Moving on to Ganssle's comments about irrealism and God (humans, 
moral and aesthetic realities), I agree that if God were independent of partic-
ular worlds, then the whole exercise in irrealism collapses. In the earlier 
essay I did speak that way. But more recently I have seen the error of my 
ways, and I have tried to be more careful. God is not independent of partic-
ular worlds but God (and humans, at least-morals and aesthetics I think are 
more complicated) is what Lynch calls a "virtual reality," that is a reality in 
each and every world. As to the difficulty for the irrealist in articulating 
"what it is about God and human beings and moral and aesthetic realities that 
is fixed across worlds and what is not,"4 I find myself in some sympathy for 
that is precisely what I am attempting in the much longer project of which 
these papers are a small part. It is no small task. But it is one worth taking 
on, I think, and Ganssle is exactly right to ask the questions he does. 
4. Ibid., 455. 
